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Smallholder farmers’ access to inputs, finance, markets and extension is key to their success 
and contribution to rural development. In a study that was conducted in the Hhohho region of 
Eswatini, with a snowballed sample of 82 smallholders, it was found that most smallholder 
farmers are elderly women who generally had low levels of education. They predominantly 
held land that is less than 1 ha which was on Swazi Nation Land (SNL). Even those who were 
part of farmer groups operated as individuals, since group committees had difficulties in 
managing the groups. Farmers who had export market contracts were more likely to access 
bank finance, while those with NAMBoard market contracts were not. However, grouped 
farmers were more likely to access NAMBoard marketing contracts and extension services. 
The results suggest that collective operation for farmers is key to market and extension access 
but not finance. Therefore, as much as extension officers (EOs) should encourage and assist 
smallholders to form formal groups like cooperatives, they still need to go further to create 
strategies to assist the farmer cooperatives to raise capital. Cooperatives can raise capital 
through joining fees and shares, but the traditional cooperatives are inefficient in raising 
additional capital from capital endowed members and strategic partners later on in their life. 
This creates a niche for hybrid cooperatives, which are efficient in this regard. Thus, there is 
an urgent need to train EOs on the development of cooperatives and equally lobby for 
legislative innovations. This may allow the development of efficient cooperatives and improve 
the viability and sustainability of farmers. 
 




Smallholder farmers have been identified as a strategic component for economic growth and 
development in Eswatini (African Development Bank (AFDB), 2018:23; Magagula & Faki, 
1999:17; World Bank, 2011:3). However, to achieve this economic contribution, access to 
inputs, capital (finance), produce markets and effective extension services remains pivotal for 
smallholders’ success. In the 1960s-1970s, governments and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) have tried to subsidise inputs and improve extension services for farmers to improve 
food security and rural income, however, these strategies were proven to be unsustainable and 
detrimental to the microeconomics of countries (Crawford et al, 2003:278-279; Kelly, Adesina 
& Gordon, 2003:380), subsequently farmers had to find these resources at market prices and 
on their own. This situation became a difficult hurdle for most smallholder farmers, and 
therefore the need for farmers to organise themselves and coordinate with the financial, inputs 
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and produce markets became inevitable. Although it is clear that extension is central to 
smallholder success especially in coordinating farmers with markets, it is also regrettable that 
the provision of public extension services to poor smallholder farmers has declined over the 
years and has faced general neglect from governments (Connolly, Ndlangamandla & 
Sikhondze, 2011; Oladele et al, 2009). 
 
Kelly et al (2003:400) argued that governments and donors should focus on providing public 
goods that improve the use of inputs rather than directly putting subsidies on inputs. These 
public goods include rural infrastructure (roads, markets, electrification), basic education 
particularly in rural areas, agriculture research and extension, market information systems, 
grades and standards (establishment and enforcement), improved contract law and enforcement 
procedures, World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations that improve Africa’s competitive 
position, and a stable policy environment (Kelly et al, 2003:400). Governments seem to have 
a lot to do with limited resources, which limit their potential to fully assist smallholder farmers, 
therefore, the involvement of strategic partners (private sector) and entrepreneurial individuals 
into farmer groups may alleviate these challenges.  
 
The literature remains consistent regarding the fact that cooperatives are central to smallholder 
farmers’ access to inputs, capital, produce markets, value adding operations, and services 
(Berdegué, Biénabe & Peppelenbos, 2008:1; Devaux et al, 2009:2; Hellin, Lundy & Meijer, 
2009:17; Louw et al, 2007:540; Louw et al, 2008:296; Markelova et al, 2009:2; Ortmann & 
King, 2007:20-21; Reardon, Timmer & Minten, 2010:1233; Simelane, 2011; Xaba & Masuku, 
2012:112). Therefore, extension officers (EOs) should encourage and assist farmers to develop 
formal groups such as cooperatives; however, they need to understand the institutional 
limitations around traditional cooperatives (Cook, 1995:1156). The challenges of traditional 
cooperatives have given rise to hybrid cooperatives called new generation cooperatives (NGCs) 
in most developed countries (Hensley & Swanson, 2003; van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006). The 
NGC structure attracts capital from capital bestowed members and is flexible to become an 
investor shared cooperative (ISC) which brings strategic partners (private sector) to invest into 
cooperatives.  
 
2. DEFINITION OF PROBLEMS 
 
The literature on smallholder farmers throughout developing countries, including Eswatini, 
reports that they reside in awkward rural areas with underdeveloped infrastructure (roads), they 
are poor, lack assets, cannot access finance, have small land parcels usually with low fertility, 
low levels of education, poorly coordinated value chains, and are elderly (Dorward, Kydd & 
Poulton, 2005:81-83; Jari & Fraser, 2009:1133; Magagula & Faki, 1999:14; Masuku, Masuku 
& Mutangira, 2016:58; Ngugi, Gitau & Nyoro, 2007:13-14; Ortmann & King, 2007). The over-
arching recommendation is that smallholders should organise themselves into formally 
institutionalised groups such as cooperatives to alleviate some of these socio-economic 
barriers. As much as this may be true, the literature on cooperatives in Eswatini suggests that 
even farmer cooperatives still face most of these challenges. Farmer cooperatives in Eswatini 
were found to have challenges relating to accessing capital (risk capital), markets, and were 
clouded with poor management (Hlatshwako, 2010; Masuku et al, 2016; Mavimbela, Masuku 
& Belete, 2010). Some cooperatives in Swaziland were developed by external development 
agents, governments, and private companies (Levin, 1987), however, after the external support 
seized they collapsed. While acknowledging other factors that may be at play for the poor 
performance of cooperatives in Eswatini, mention should be given to the general poverty in 
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rural areas, land tenure (Levin, 1987), weak extension (Connolly et al, 2011; Keregero, 
2000:80; World Bank, 2011), and inefficient institutions which cooperatives are built on. 
Therefore, as we suggest cooperatives to farmers, we need to also suggest how these 
organisations can be strengthened. 
 
There is a general poor performance of horticultural smallholder farmers in Eswatini. They 
struggle to access capital for investing in value adding activities and have poor management 
(Masuku et al, 2016). These farmers still struggle, even when they are organised into 
cooperatives, and these challenges diminish the positive impact that rural agribusiness can 
contribute to rural economic growth and development. This paper supports the role for 
cooperatives in strengthening rural smallholder farmers, but it also advocates for institutional 
evolution on cooperatives legislation to enhance their viability and sustainability. It used a case 
of smallholder farmers in the Hhohho region of Eswatini and literature review to build a case 




3.1 Study area 
 
The study was conducted in the Hhohho region of Eswatini. This region is in the northern part 
of Eswatini with coordinates 26o00’S31o30’E. It has an area of about 3625.17 km2 with a 
population of 1.4 million (Worldometers, 2019). The Hhohho region is predominantly overlaid 
by the Highveld and Middleveld geographic regions. The Highveld has the highest altitude of 
900-1400 masl; the Middleveld ranges from 400-600 masl with an annual rainfall of between 
500-1500 mm [Ministry of Tourism and Environment Affairs (MTEA), 2011:4]. This makes 
the Hhohho region to be less prone to drought; hence most rural communities still practice rain-
fed subsistence agriculture alongside semi-commercial practices to purely commercial 
agriculture. 
 
A total of four Rural Development Areas (RDAs) are spread across the Hhohho region. The 
RDAs are government driven strategic points for decentralising public extension services to 
rural communities and EOs are housed here. The centres provide extension services to both 
subsistence and commercial farmers. The services include general farming information and 
technical services ranging from soil testing, subsidised tractor services, agronomic services. 
 
3.2 Sampling and data collection 
 
Within the four RDAs, there were only 13 EOs dealing with horticultural activities in the 
region. The other few EOs were dealing with the other technical services. The study sampled 
all 13 EOs who filled a questionnaire with both structured and open-ended questions. Focus 
group discussions were conducted with RDA extension leaders during their meetings. 
Alongside this data collection from EOs, a snowballed sample of 82 horticultural smallholder 
farmers was interviewed. The interviews were conducted using a questionnaire with both 
structured and open-ended questions.  
 
3.3 Data analysis 
 
Data from questionnaires and individual interviews were coded and entered into the Statistical 
Package for Social Science (SPSS), version 10. The small data sample of EOs limited in-depth 
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data analysis for the study, thus only descriptive analysis was done. The data was presented 
and supported by data from group discussions. However the farmers’ data was analysed on 
descriptive statistics and correlations.  
 
3.4 Literature review on strengthening of cooperatives  
 
Kherallah and Kirsten (2002) argued that the new institutional economics (NIE) theory 
provides an economy with both theory (neo-classical economics) and institutions (classical 
economics) to explain the determinants and evolution of institutions over time and evaluate 
their impact on economic performance, efficiency and distribution. Recent studies on 
cooperatives have been dominated by the NIE theory (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Cook, 1995; 
Cook & Burress, 2009; Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999; Harris, Stefanson & Fulton, 1996; Rosairo 
et al, 2012; Sykuta & Cook, 2001; Woodford, 2008), and they come into consensus that 
traditional cooperatives suffer from ill-defined property rights that cause conflicts over residual 
claims and decision control. They then recommend that countries should evolve their 
legislation to allow institutional innovations in cooperatives by-laws which enable them to give 
incentives for capital investment. This would concomitantly result in the development of new 
generation cooperatives (hybrid cooperatives) which would provide incentives for capital more 
than the traditional structures which only promoted patronage. This innovation has gained 
importance as the markets have evolved to push value adding activities to farmers and they 
impose standards which require frequent investments to meet (Louw et al, 2008:296). 




4.1 Demographic characteristics of smallholder farmers 
 
The results indicated that 52 farmers were above 50 years of age and the modal age group was 
61-70 years. The modal age suggests that a large number of the farmers were pensioners since 
the retirement age in Eswatini is 60 years. The youth (<31 years) only consisted of five farmers 
as shown in Figure 1. The dominance of the aged group may suggest that farming was more of 
a livelihood strategy (food security and income) for elderly people.  
 
 
Figure 1: The number of smallholders as categorised in age groups 
 
According to Table 1, most of the smallholder farmers were females across all the age groups, 
except for the age group of 21-30 years. The dominance of female farmers may mean that 
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widened from age group 31-60 years, however, it converged at age groups of 61 years and 
above. This may reflect that even males start farming after they retire from their off-farm jobs.  
 
Table 1: The relationship between farmers’ age group and their gender 
Farmers’ Gender 
Farmers’ Age Groups 














4 2 1 8 13 0 28 34.2 
1 7 15 14 15 2 54 65.8 
Total 5 9 16 22 28 2 82 100 
Total % Farmers 6.1 11.0 19.5 26.8 34.2 2.4 100 100 
 
A total of 65.8% of the farmers were married while only 9.8% were still single (Figure 2). If 
the percentage of widowed farmers is added with the percentage of the married farmers, it is 
found that 89% had families. Furthermore, the correlation results analysis showed that marital 
status was positively correlated to farmers’ age (r=0.416, p=0.000) and to farmers’ gender 
(r=0.337, p=0.002) at 99% confidence level. These results show these farmers were generally 
married female and who were aged.  
 
 
Figure 2: The marital status of farmer respondents  
 
The farmers who participated in the study were well experienced in farming (Table 2). More 
than 70% had farming experience of above five years. About nineteen (19%) percent had been 
farming for more than 30 years. Notable, is the fact that female farmers were generally more 
experienced in farming than their male counterparts. The high experience for females is in line 
with the results shown in Table 1 where it is seen that females start farming earlier than males.  
However, this experience cannot be simply translated to mean production proficiency and 
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Table 2: The farming experience of farmers in relation to gender 
 














11 13 24 29 
5 13 18 22 
2 8 10 12 
4 4 8 9 
1 6 7 9 
1 3 4 5 
2 2 4 5 
2 5 7 9 
Total 28 54 82 100 
% Farmers 34.1 65.9 100 100 
 
Approximately 60% of the farmers dropped out of school before they reached the higher 
secondary level of education (Figure 3). Only 3.7% had tertiary education, while the percentage 
of those who never went to school at all stood at 14.6%. This showed that the levels of 
education were generally low amongst farmers. Therefore, they need proficient EOs to advise, 




Figure 3: Level of education achieved by farmer respondents 
 
Male farmers had more access to formal education than female farmers as shown in Table 3. 
The most alarming statistics is that 92% of the farmers who never went to school were female, 
however, at higher secondary level of education there was parity between the sexes. The results 
analysis revealed that there was a negative correlation between highest level of education and 
farmers’ age (r=-0.294, p=0.007) and for marital status (r=-0.378, p = 0.000) at 99% confidence 
level. When viewed in line with the results, the analysis shows that the higher the level of 
education, the lower the age of the farmers and the higher likelihood of being single. It means 
younger farmers were more likely to have higher levels of education and single. Therefore if 
older farmers work together with younger farmers who have better chances of comprehending 
scientific and agribusiness technological innovations, the chances for efficient business skills 
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Table 3: Comparison between male and female farmers regarding access to formal 
education 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates the trend between males and a female in as far as access to education 
was concerned. There were more female dropouts at the lower levels of education than males; 
however, the disparity diminishes at the higher secondary level to tertiary level. Although, it 
still remains that the majority of farmers dropped out of school without completing secondary 
education. This makes it difficult for them to get non-farm professional careers and thus they 
resort to farming. The general low levels of education may hinder the ability of farmers to 
manage their businesses well and form effective linkages with markets (finance, inputs, 
produce) because such linkages are technical and can be complicated even for professionals.  
 
 





Farmers grew field crops in summer (warm season crops) and vegetable crops in winter (cool 
season crops). All the farmers grew maize in summer for substance reasons, however, some 
sold the maize as green mealies while others sold surplus of dried maize. Those who had access 
to  more land also grew sweet potatoes, cassava and beans on the extra fields, while others 
would intercrop beans, pumpkins, melons and jugo beans with the maize. Rice and yams were 
grown on specifically designed fields, namely rice paddies and wet lands for yams. After 














































Highest Level Of Education Reached
Males
Females






















Male 1 2 4 11 9 1 28 65.9 
Female 11 6 10 16 9 2 54 34.1 
Total 12 8 14 27 18 3 82 100 
% Framers 14.6 9.8 17.1 32.9 22 3.7 100 100 
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fenced fields. The main vegetables grown were tomatoes, cabbages, onion and carrots. The 
field crops were predominantly rain-fed, except for rice, while the cool season crops were 
irrigated.  
A total of 97.6% of the farmers were farming on Swazi Nation Land (SNL)4 and 89.1% owned 
a hectare or less of land (Table 4) and extra land was generally not accessible (see Table 6 in 
Appendix 1). These results meant that the large majority of the farmers owned small land 
parcels with unsecured5 tenure. Levin (1987) also reported similar findings on farmer schemes. 
The farmer-schemes were grouped farmers who were operating individually. These schemes 
had farmer absentees and hence more land in the schemes laid fallow as owners were no longer 
interested in farming or have passed on and it is difficult to allocate it to others or families are 
failing to decide who shall inherit the land. Dlamini and Masuku (2011:301) reported that the 
tenure insecurity in SNL resulted in underinvestment on farm infrastructure and it undervalues 
the land as an asset. Deininger and Jin (2008: 67) as well as Huy, Lyne, Ratna & Nuthall (2015: 
476) found that secured tenure improves the efficiency of land transfer (rent it out, sales). 
Therefore, the land rights on farmland in Eswatini needs some improvements (to enable ease 
of transfer), and the capacitation of capacity of chiefs to govern the rights. This may enable 
efficient use of the land and reduce fallow arable land. The small parcels of land reduces the 
potential of individual farmers to access affluent markets since they cannot meet scale and also 
diversify their production using the small land parcels. Therefore, in the current situation 
farmers need to coordinate and collaborate their operations to improve their capacity to meet 
market scales and pool resources to invest in farm infrastructure (like irrigation) as they 
generally lacked access to such resources (see Table 6 in Appendix 1). 
 
Most of the farmers (72%) targeted the spot market while only 1.2% had access to export 
market. Access to contract markets like NAMBoard and exports was low, which may largely 
be contributed by lack of information on markets and the generally non-market led farming 
strategies. Moreover, this may be a factor of farmers unable to meet standards, scale, low farm 
investments, lack of knowledge of those markets and low bargaining power. Collective action 
(working together) may alleviate these challenges (Ortmann & King, 2007) and EOs need to 
facilitate the formation of formal farmer groups and provide market information to assist 
farmers adopt market-led production strategies 
 
  
                                                 
4 It is a type of land tenure in Swaziland which represents communal land. By definition it is the land the King 
holds in custody for the nation and is managed by chiefs who allocate it to subjects. Farmers only have use rights 
and no ownership rights. 
5 The land is given to families rather than individuals which makes the transfer of tenure difficult for larger families 
when the parents pass on. 
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Table 4: Characteristics of the farmers’ projects in general 
 
Characteristics Variables Frequency % 
Type of land tenure Swazi Nation Land (SNL) 80 97.6 
Title deed Land (TDL) 2 2.4 
Acquisition of land Bought it (TDL) 1 1.2 
Personally khonta-ed 25 30.5 
Belongs to my family 19 23.2 
Borrowed by neighbour or friend (TDL) 1 1.2 
Communal farmer group fields 36 43.9 
Farm size <1Ha 55 67.1 
1Ha 18 22.0 
2Ha 3 3.7 
>3Ha 6 7.3 
Target market Export 1 1.2 
Local homestead & shops 59 72.0 
Urban Vendors 5 6.1 
NAMBoard 7 8.5 
Urban shops and Export 10 12.2 
Possession of any 
marketing contract 
Yes   19 23.3 
No 63 76.8 
Rate current 
production 
Poor 1 1.2 
Below Average 11 13.4 
Average 36 43.9 
Above Average 31 37.8 
Excellent 3 3.7 
5-year projection of 
yield 
Increase 28 34.1 
Same 21 25.6 
Decrease 33 40.2 
 
According to Table 5, fifty-one (51%) percent of the farmers were organised in communal 
farmer groups, but operating individually, and 41.5% were not in any group. The percentage 
of farmers who wished to work as a cooperative (46.3%) and those who were not interested 
(43.9%) was almost equal. This showed that farmers were not sure if collective action could 
help them. Such perception may have emanated from bad previous experience with 
cooperatives that were poorly managed. From the group discussions, it was found that farmers 
found it difficult to form formal groups as others disrespected those in farmer-groups’ 
leadership positions. There was a highly negative significant relationship between the way 
farmers are organised and farm size (r=-0.301, p=0.006) and with the access to EOs (r=-0.289, 
p=0.009). This analysis indicated that if farmers had a small piece of land, they were more 
likely to be in groups while those with larger land sizes were more likely to work individually. 
Although this was just a description of farmer schemes that grouped farmers on one location 
but did not work together. The analysis further suggests that grouped farmers were more likely 
to be visited by EOs. Therefore, the government and NGOs should assist EOs to organise 
famers into formal groups to pool their land parcels and also get more access to EOs. They 
should become an integral adviser of the group.  
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Table 5: How the farmers were organised in the Hhohho region 
 
Organisations Variables Frequency % 
Farmer Organisation Individual farmer 34 41.5 
Registered cooperative 6 7.3 
Farmer group with individual operations 42 51.2 
Are you willing to 
work as a 
cooperative? 
Not interested 36 43.9 
Not sure 8 9.8 
Definitely interested 38 46.3 
Are you registered 
with NAMBoard? 
Yes 31 37.8 
Still to register 10 12.2 
Will never register 39 47.6 
Have withdrawn my membership 2 2.4 
SNAU membership Yes 12 14.6 
No 70 85.4 
 
A total of 50% (47.6% + 2.4%) of the farmers did not want to work with NAMBoard (Table 
5). The correlation results analysis revealed a negative correlation (r=-0.274, p=0.013) between 
farmers who had marketing contracts with NAMBoard and farmers working as individuals. 
This suggests that NAMBoard used to target farmers who were in groups mainly because they 
will meet scale and it is easier to provide extension, monitor production and collect produce. 
NAMBoard provided these farmers with inputs, capital and extension. The results analysis 
further revealed a highly significant (99% confidence level) positive correlation (r=0.385, 
p=0.00) between farmers who were members of Swaziland National Agriculture Union 
(SNAU) and those who had marketing contracts with NAMBoard. This shows that grouped 
farmers were more likely to obtain marketing contracts with NAMBoard and further join the 
farmers’ union (SNAU). Therefore SNAU and NAMBoard need to work together to support 
farmers.  
 
Farmers perceived bank loans were not accessible (Table 6 in Appendix 1). This challenge may 
have also been aggravated by the fact that the smallholder farmers were aged, less educated to 
draw bankable business plans, keep proper business records, have market contracts and 
collateral which banks required. There was a highly significant positive relationship between 
access to export markets and access to business loans (r=0.402, p=0.000). This shows that 
financial institutions viewed exports market contracts as a factor that reduces loan default risk. 
Therefore, EOs need to help farmers gain access to viable markets through assisting them to 
formally coordinate with reliable produce markets. This may provide them with access to credit 
to invest into value adding assets. However, to meet these market requirements, they also need 
to meet required grades and standards.  
 
5. LIMITATION OF TRADITIONAL COOPERATIVES AND COPING STRATEGIES 
 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory on cooperatives suggests that traditional 
cooperatives are inefficient in attracting investment (risk capital) either from members or 
investors (Beverland, 2007:480; Chaddad & Cook, 2004:4; Cook, 1995:1156; Cook & 
Iliopoulos, 1999:528) since they suffer from ill-defined property rights. The risk capital is 
required for farm upgrades to meet grades and standards, services, research, information, inputs 
and other expensive value adding assets with high specificity. The capital may be contributed 
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by capital bestowed members, strategic partners and investors. The ill-defined property rights 
of cooperatives as argued by Cook (1995) stem from cooperatives founding principles. These 
principles discourage members from investing additional capital into their cooperatives. This 
is because even if a member invests extra capital in a traditional cooperative, it does not give 
him/ her more power in decision making, or access to more benefits (patronage or cash 
incentives), and the capital cannot be traded or used as collateral nor does it accumulate interest. 
Cook (1995:1156-1157) categorised these limitations into five major problems, namely (i) free-
rider problems6, (ii) influence problem7, (iii) horizon problem8, (iv) portfolio problem9, and (v) 
control problem10. Therefore, traditional cooperatives can obtain finance (investment) from 
founding members or new members’ joining fees but would struggle to raise value adding 
capital later on in their life time. This situation forces cooperatives to demutualise into 
companies and lose their incentives and status as pro-poor organisations. The worst part is 
when they become dormant or collapse because they cannot access value adding capital.  
 
Esnard, Lyne and Old (2016), Lyne and Collins (2008:180), as well as Rosairo et al (2012:514-
515) found that these limitations of traditional cooperatives in attracting additional capital can 
be alleviated by allowing cooperatives to offer a B-Class share on top of the membership 
shares. This B-Class share should be tradable (non-redeemable) and appreciating at market11 
value. It can be conferred limited voting rights not. This share can be positioned as a preferred 
share that carries higher dividend for non-patron members (in multipurpose cooperatives) or 
paired with patronage as a “delivery right”12 or be listed in the open stock market to attract 
strategic partners and investors (non-members). This alleviates the free-rider problem, horizon 
problem, portfolio problem and control problem. They also recommended that there should be 
separation of power between ownership and management rights, and that strategic decision 
making should be given to capable managers and directors who are democratically elected to 
alleviate the influence problem. These directors must have full autonomy to run the cooperative 
without bureaucratic interference. These institutional innovations allow farmers to develop 
hybrid cooperative structures like the NGCs and ISC which dominate several countries in the 
developed world (Hensley & Swanson, 2003; van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006; Woodford, 2008). 
They reward capital fairly as patronage without losing all the cooperative’s principles. These 
institutional innovations have the potential to revive farmer cooperatives. 
 
A desktop review of the Eswatini legislation for cooperatives using the NIE theory (Simelane, 
2017) suggests that cooperatives formed under the Swaziland’s Cooperative Societies Act 
(2003) and Swaziland’s Cooperative Societies Regulations (2005) would alleviate the 
influence and partly the free rider problem. This is because it gives directors full autonomy 
over strategic decision making and control over managers. These directors are all member 
patrons and are elected through a secret ballot. However, the horizon, portfolio and control 
problem would still persist since it provides little incentive to trade shares and these shares do 
not appreciate. The legislation allows companies to join cooperatives but the incentives are 
                                                 
6 Benefits accrue more to patronage than capital investments and they cannot fix membership. 
7 Voting is egalitarian. 
8 There are no capital gains on shares (shares redeemed at par value). 
9 Shares are not tradable (but redeemable) when a member leaves the cooperative. 
10 Shares do not have market signals and cannot be used to incentivise managers since they only have value to 
patron-members. 
11 The market can be amongst members or even open market. 
12 The right to deliver certain quantities of the commodity of defined quality and time 
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discouraging. This is because non-patron members would get a 5% capped dividend on capital 




Smallholder farmers were generally female, elderly, less educated, small land holders who 
lacked access to coordinated markets, individually operating and generally full-time farmers. 
The individualism, lack of coordinated produce markets, and low levels of education may be 
barriers to finance access since it increases the risk profile of farmers. The lack of access to 
finance worsens their challenges as it limits their capacity to invest in value adding to access 
better markets. The correlation analysis suggested that organised farmers were more likely to 
gain access to local markets contracts and extension support. However, only export markets 
contract could give access to bank loans. Therefore extension officers should strive to bring 
farmers into cooperatives. However, the literature on cooperatives in Eswatini suggests that 
cooperatives also struggle to access markets and finance. This supports the literature that 
traditional cooperatives suffer from ill-defined property rights; hence they are inefficient in 
accessing risk (additional) capital. The challenges acquired by traditional cooperatives limits 
their business efficiency and the concomitant socio-economic development of their members 
who are usually poor rural people. Developed countries have long ago realised the limitations 
in traditional cooperatives and developed hybrid cooperatives called NGCs and ISC. This is 
because such cooperatives are able to attract investment from capital endowed members and 
strategic partners into the cooperative for value adding which also strengthens the management 
of the cooperative. This innovation can be adopted by allowing cooperatives to introduce a B-
class share that would be tradable (non-redeemable) and appreciable with limited or no voting 




The Eswatini government should work with NGOs to drive the process of organizing and 
institutionalising smallholders into formal groups through  qualified (trained) EOs to because 
they are trained on group dynamics, communications and behaviour change. It is also 
recommended that the EOs form part of the cooperatives’ management to provide strategic 
advice and guide cooperative directors in managing their organisation. The EOs should have 
no decision making powers but knowledgeable in agribusiness. Then the government should 
allow cooperatives to form hybrid structures as they have shown viability in other countries. If 
the government adopts the legislative transformation in-line with the NIE theory on 
cooperatives, it would be advisable that both farmers and EOs are trained to understand these 
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Key: A – Accessible (mean: 1.0 – 1.50); LA – Less accessible (mean:1.51 – 2.5); NA – Not 
accessible (mean:2.51 – 3.0) 
Table 6: The level of accessibility of important resources to farmers as perceived by 
farmer respondents 
 
Resources needed by farmers N Min Max Mean Std. Dev Comment 
How accessible are inputs i.e. seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides, seedlings? 
82 1 3 1.75 0.56 LA 
How accessible are insurance 
products? 
82 1 3 2.90 0.34 NA 
How accessible is the labour if 
needed? 
82 1 3 2.21 0.67 LA 
How accessible is irrigation water? 82 1 3 1.91 0.60 LA 
How accessible are export 
opportunities? 
82 1 3 2.78 0.50 NA 
How accessible is information on 
good markets? 
82 1 3 2.64 0.53 NA 
How accessible are reliable local 
markets e.g. shop/restaurants 
contracts? 
82 1 3 2.62 0.56 NA 
How much access do you have to 
technical knowledge? 
82 1 3 1.50 0.74 A 
How accessible is more arable land? 82 1 3 1.83 0.67 LA 
How accessible is the tractor and other 
new technology? 
82 1 3 1.65 0.57 LA 
How accessible are business loans for 
you? 
82 1 3 2.64 0.53 NA 
How accessible are Agribusiness 
workshops? 
82 1 3 2.05 0.65 LA 
 
